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THE BUILDING OF CHINA’S GREAT WALL AT 
SEA 
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 15, 1962, photographs from a U-2 reconnaissance 
aircraft revealed that the Soviet Union was secretly assembling 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Cuba.1  A week later, President 
Kennedy publicly revealed the discovery of the missiles and announced 
that the United States was imposing a maritime quarantine to prevent the 
introduction of additional missiles and materials to Cuba.2  Following a 
number of confrontations at sea, on October 28, 1962, Nikita 
Khrushchev gave in to U.S. demands for the removal of nuclear weapons 
from Cuba.3  As Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated: “We’re eyeball to 
eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”4 
Nearly fifty years later, two rival powers once again stood eyeball to 
eyeball, but this time it was the United States that “blinked.”  China, in 
recent years, has strenuously objected to U.S. intervention in the South 
China, East China, and Yellow Seas.  Despite proclaiming an interest in 
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 1. Cuban Missile Crisis, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Thomas Blanton, Annals of Blinksmanship, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVES, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/annals.htm (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2012).   
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the region and voicing support for its regional partners, the United States, 
until recently, has largely failed to demonstrate its support by taking 
action.  China’s neighbors have been forced to succumb to Chinese 
pressure, with no actual assistance from the United States.  By engaging 
its “anti-access strategy,” China has been the victor in numerous high 
profile showdowns with neighboring claimants in this region.  China has 
flexed its newfound muscle and has been successful in using force and 
threatening economic sanctions to accomplish its goals. 
These events mark the beginning of the final phase of China’s effort 
to erect a new great wall at sea—a wall that has been under construction 
since the end of World War II.  China has built walls since the fifth 
century B.C. to protect itself from invasion.5  While previous wall-
building efforts were confined to land, China has turned its attention to 
the sea and is attempting to assert sovereignty over disputed islands and 
vast maritime resources, to protect and expand its southern and eastern 
maritime boundaries, and to enhance its naval capabilities to counter 
U.S. Navy dominance in the Pacific. Unless the United States and its 
allies take immediate, proactive steps to counter Beijing’s resurgence in 
its self-proclaimed zone of influence, any hope of keeping China from 
dominating the western Pacific will be lost. 
II. THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: 
CREATION OF THE WALL 
A.  The Origins of the Wall—the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea 
The foundation for the southern portion of the wall was first laid 
when China officially issued a map that claimed the Pratas, Paracel, and 
Spratly Islands, as well as the Macclesfield Bank, as part of China.6   
Using a U-shaped “eleven-dotted line,” frequently referred to as the 
“Cow’s Tongue,” China claimed an area extending south to James Shoal, 
4° north latitude.7  Use of the U-shaped eleven-dotted line was initially 
reaffirmed by the newly established government of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, but was subsequently replaced by a nine-
                                            
 5. See Great Wall History, GREAT WALL OF CHINA,  http://www.greatwall-of-
china.com/51-90/the-great-wall-of-china.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).   
 6. Li Jinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China 
Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 287, 290 (2003). 
 7. Id. at 289-90.  
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dotted line in 1953 after Zhou Enlai authorized the elimination of the 
two-dotted line portion in the Gulf of Tonkin.8   
Although it is unclear from the map and subsequent official 
statements whether China is claiming the U-shaped line as a maritime 
boundary or is simply claiming sovereignty over the land features and 
adjacent waters within the line, efforts to reinforce the southern wall 
through the enactment of domestic legislation, diplomatic protests, and 
threats and coercion have continued over the past sixty years.9  Maps 
depicting the U-shaped line appeared most recently in Chinese protests to 
Vietnam’s and Malaysia’s extended continental shelf submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009.10 
B.  Strengthening the Wall 
China reaffirmed its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands 
when it declared a twelve nautical mile (nm) territorial sea in 1958.11  
Similar assertions were made in 1992,12 twice in 1996,13 and in 2009.14  
                                            
 8. Id. at 290. 
 9. Id. at 292-93.   
 10. See Letter from the People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General 
Referencing the Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; see also Letter from the 
People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General Referencing the Submission 
By the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (May 7, 2009),  available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_ 
vnm.pdf.   
 11. Resolution of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s 
Territorial Sea (1958) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 
4, 1958) (China), available at  
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rotscotnpcotaotdotgocts1338/.  
 12. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992), art. 2 (1992) (China), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/ legis/cen/laws/tsatcz392/. 
 13. See U.N. Office of Legal Affairs Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, 
Declarations and Statements, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_declarations. htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012); see also Statement of the 
Chinese Government on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea (promulgated by the State 
Council, May 15, 1996, effective date May 15, 1996),  art. 2 (China), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/sotcgotbotts659/.   
 14. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Island Protection (decree of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/ law/201001/t20100110_300174.html. 
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China asserted its sovereignty over all of the South China Sea islands and 
their adjacent waters and continental shelves in two diplomatic protests 
filed with the United Nations in 2009.15   The first protest was filed after 
the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 9522, defining the new 
Philippine archipelagic baselines and reasserting Filipino sovereignty 
over the Kalayaan Island group and Scarborough Shoal in the South 
China Sea.16  The second protest was in response to Vietnam’s 
submission17 and Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint submission18 to the 
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, both 
claiming extended continental shelves in the South China Sea.   
The seawall was further strengthened when China enacted various 
laws over the course of a decade: the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which illegally 
claimed security jurisdiction in the contiguous zone;19 the 1998 Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which illegally required 
foreign warships to give prior notice before transiting the Chinese 
territorial sea in innocent passage;20 the 1999 Marine Environment 
                                            
 15. Letter from the People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General Referencing 
the Republic Act No. 9522 to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Apr. 13, 
2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/communicationsredeposit/mzn69_2009_chn.pdf; Letter from the 
People’s Republic of China Referencing the Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam, supra note 10; Letter from the People’s Republic of China Referencing 
the Submission by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, supra note 10.  
 16. An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by 
Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines and For 
Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9522 (2009) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_ 9522_2009.html.  
 17. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 11, 2009, Receipt of Submission Made 
by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ 
vnm37_09/vnm_clcs37_2009e.pdf.  
 18. U.N. Secretary–General, Letter dated May 7, 2009, Receipt of Joint Submission 
Made by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ mysvnm_clcs33_2009e.pdf.  
 19. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, supra note 12, art. 13. This law violates part II of the UNCLOS, which limits 
coastal state jurisdiction in the contiguous zone to customs, fiscal, immigration, or 
sanitary laws. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 19 (2)(g), Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 20. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12, art. 7. This 
law violates part II of UNCLOS, which guarantees the right of innocent passage to all 
ships, including warships, without prior notice or consent of the coastal state. See 
UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 19, at 404. 
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Protection Law, which illegally applied China’s environmental laws to 
all ships, including warships, in waters under Chinese jurisdiction;21 and 
the 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law, which illegally regulated all 
marine data collection, including hydrographic surveys and military data 
collection, in waters under Chinese jurisdiction.22  Many of the 
provisions of these laws are inconsistent with international law, 
exemplifying China’s ongoing lawfare23 strategy to misstate or misapply 
international legal norms to accommodate its anti-access strategy.   
Finally, in March of 2010, Beijing announced that the South China 
Sea was a “core interest” for China, a characterization China had 
previously reserved for its most sensitive internal security concerns—
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.24  Despite the fact that some Chinese 
officials are in disagreement about the merits of taking such a strong 
action,25 this announcement demonstrated that Beijing no longer sees 
room for compromise with the other South China Sea claimants and will 
likely resort to force to protect its interests in the region if necessary.    
In 1974, capitalizing on Washington’s pre-occupation with the 
United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, China invaded the Paracel 
Islands, easily overwhelming the South Vietnamese garrison and 
illegally occupying the islands.26  Over the next thirty years, China 
                                            
 21. Marine Environment Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999), art. 2 (China), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ meplotproc607/. This law violates many of the 
provisions of part XII of UNCLOS, including article 236, which exempts sovereign 
immune vessels from compliance with the environmental provisions of the convention.  
See UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 236, at 494. 
 22. Surveying and Mapping Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 29, 2002), art. 2 (China), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/ 
laws/samlotproc 506/. This law violates parts V and XIII of UNCLOS, which distinguish 
between coastal state jurisdiction over marine scientific research in the exclusive 
economic zone  and user state freedoms to engage in other survey/marine data collection 
activities in the exclusive economic zone.  See UNCLOS, supra note 19, pts. V & XIII. 
 23. Lawfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare that can be defined as the use or 
misuse of international law to attack or condemn an opponent’s position or actions in 
order to win a public support.  See Charles Dunlap, Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-
Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCES Q., 34, 35 (2009), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515192. 
 24. Peter Lee, US Goes Fishing for Trouble, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 29, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG29Ad02.html.  
 25. Edward Wong, China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea is a ‘Core Interest’ 
Worth War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/ 
31beijing.html.  
 26. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS – SOUTH 
CHINA SEA 2 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/South_China_Sea/ 
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dramatically increased its military presence in the Paracels, constructing 
a large military airfield on Woody Island and an intelligence monitoring 
facility on an adjacent island that would serve as forward operating bases 
for combat operations in the South China Sea.27  In 1988, another clash 
between China and Vietnam at Johnson South Reef resulted in the 
sinking of several Vietnamese ships and the death of seventy Vietnamese 
sailors.28  Following this engagement, China occupied six additional key 
islets in the Spratly archipelago.29  In 1995, China secretly occupied 
Mischief Reef,30 an islet located within the Philippine exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), 130 miles from Palawan Island, and strategically 
situated astride one of Asia’s most important sea lanes—the Palawan 
Strait.31  China’s presence on the reef gave it the ability to disrupt 
maritime traffic transiting the Malacca and Singapore straits to the 
Philippines and northern Asia.  Despite Filipino protest calling for 
China’s withdrawal from the islet, China has continued its illegal 
military build-up of the reef since 1999.32 
As another means of projecting power in the South China Sea, China 
continues to improve its naval base on Hainan Island.33  Press reports 
have also indicated that China intends to deploy its new anti-ship 
ballistic missile (DF-21D “carrier killer”), currently in production, at a 
new military base in Guangdong Province. 34  With a reported range of 
                                                                                                  
pdf.pdf; Eleanor Duckwall, China’s Naval Buildup – Mischief Reef and More, ELEANOR 
DUCKWALL’S SPOTLIGHT (July 7, 2009), http://sixthcolumn.typepad.com/duckwalls/2009/ 
07/chinas-naval-buildup-mischief-reef-and-more.html; ICE Case Studies, Spartly Island 
Dispute, TRADE & ENV’T DATABASE (1997), http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/ 
spratly.htm (last visited June 21, 2012); Le Duc, History of Chinese Imperialism in 
Vietnam: From Viet Nam to Paracel/Spratly, PARACEL & SPRATLY ISLAND FORUM, 
http://paracelspratlyislands.blogspot.com/2008/01/history-of-chinese-imperialism-in.html 
(last visited June 21, 2012).  
 27. Andrei Chang, Analysis: China’s Air-Sea Buildup, SPACE WAR (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Chinas_air-sea_buildup_999.html.  
 28. Military Clashes in the South China Sea, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-clash.htm (last modified Nov. 
7, 2011). 
 29. See Duckwell, supra note 26; ICE Cast Studies, supra note 26. 
 30.  See Duckwell, supra note 26. 
 31. Id. 
 32. David G. Wiencek, South China Sea Flashpoint, CHINA BRIEF, Dec. 31, 2001, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3735&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=191&no_cache=1.  
 33. See Duckwell, supra note 26. 
 34. Wendall Minnick, China Builds First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Base?, DEF. 
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100805/DEFSECT01/ 
8050301/China-Builds-First-Anti-Ship-Ballistic-Missile-Base-.  
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up to 2,000 kilometers, the DF-21D would be able to cover most of the 
Spratly Islands.35  
Chinese aggression against Vietnam has continued unabated in the 
twenty-first century.  For example, in January 2005, Chinese naval 
vessels fired on Vietnamese fishing boats in Vietnam’s territorial sea, 
killing nine and injuring seven others.36  China justified its actions as 
acts of self-defense against armed pirates.37  Similar incidents have 
continued over the past several years, culminating in 2009 with the 
seizure of 33 Vietnamese fishing vessels and 433 crew members in the 
South China Sea.38  Additionally, in April 2010, China issued a unilateral 
fishing ban for the South China Sea in an effort to assert control over the 
region’s depleted fish stocks and seized a Vietnamese fishing boat and its 
crew in the vicinity of the Paracels.39  Five months later, China seized a 
second Vietnamese fishing vessel and its crew for allegedly fishing with 
explosives.40  Despite Hanoi’s repeated calls for immediate and 
unconditional release of the vessel and its 9 crew members, China did 
not release the crew until the 12th of October.41  The most recent spat 
occurred in March 2012, after China detained 2 Vietnamese fishing boats 
and their crews near the Paracels.42  Hanoi has called for the immediate 
and unconditional release of the two boats and their twenty-one 
crewmembers, refusing to pay the 70,000 yuan fee and demanding that 
Beijing stop hindering Vietnamese fishermen in the South China Sea.43  
Interestingly enough, Beijing’s reaction during these incidents is 
completely inconsistent with its position following the September 7, 
                                            
 35. Id.   
 36. Thi Q. Lam, Latest Gulf of Tonkin Incident Reveal’s China’s Imperialist Designs, 
PACIFIC NEWS SERV., Feb. 13, 2005, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/ 
view_article.html? article_id=48b8f8c62035 29cbd50b4ca149abeac4#. 
 37. Id. 
 38. China Seizes Vietnamese Fishing Boat, ASIA-PACIFIC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010, 
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/news/article_1549166.php/China-
seizes-Vietnamese-fishing-boat. 
 39. Id.  
 40. After Senkaku Dispute, China-Vietnam Crisis Looms in South China Sea, ASIA 
NEWS, Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/After-Senkaku-dispute,-China-
Vietnam-crisis-looms-in-South-China-Sea-19651.html#.  
 41. China Claims Release of fishermen Who Remain at Large, VIETNAM TODAY, Oct. 
16, 2010, http://www.dztimes.net/post/social/china-claims-release-of-fishermen-who-
remain-at-large.aspx. 
 42. Vietnam, China in New Spat Over Fishermen Detentions, YAHOO!NEWS.COM, 
Mar. 22, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/vietnam-china-spat-over-fishermen-detentions-
160611101.html. 
 43. Id. 
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2010  arrest of the Chinese trawler captain by Japanese authorities in the 
vicinity of the Senkakus.44  Following the captain’s arrest, Chinese 
authorities demanded the immediate release of the captain and his boat 
claiming that Japan had infringed on China’s territorial sovereignty and 
violated the captain’s human rights.45   
China has also resorted to economic coercion by threatening U.S. 
and international oil and gas companies, including Exxon/Mobil in 2008 
and BP in 2007, with loss of business opportunities in mainland China if 
they did not stop joint exploration ventures with Vietnam in the South 
China Sea.46  Most recently, in March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats 
harassed a Philippine Department of Energy vessel—the M/V Veritas 
Voyager—that was conducting a seismic survey for oil and gas in the 
vicinity of Reed Bank, ordering the vessel to leave the area.47  The 
Chinese patrols boats departed the area after Manila dispatched an OV-
10 Bronco bomber and a navy reconnaissance plane to investigate the 
incident and deter further Chinese aggression.48  Manila lodged a strong 
diplomatic protest with Beijing over the incident and indicated that it 
would upgrade the military airfield on Pag-asa (Thitu) and acquire new 
patrol ships, aircraft, and radars to better defend its South China Sea 
claims.49  The survey was completed at the end of March with the 
assistance of a Philippine Coast Guard vessel that was deployed to the 
area to deter further Chinese interference with the Voyager’s work.50  
The Reed Bank oil and gas fields are located well within the Philippine-
                                            
 44. See Martin Fackler & Ian Johnson, Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat 
Captain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/ 
world/asia/25chinajapan.html?pagewanted=all. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Jason Folkmanis, China Warms Some Oil Companies on Work with Vietnam, U.S. Says, 
BLOOMBERG, July 16, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20670001&sid 
=ak.1QfnkDStU; Peter Navarro, China Stirs Over Offshore Oil Pact, ASIA TIMES, July 23, 
2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html; U.S. Sees No Recent China Pressure on 
Global Oil Companies in South Sea, Bloomberg, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-08-18/u-s-sees-no-recent-china-pressure-on-global-oil-companies-in-south-sea.html.  
 47. Jamie Laude, AFP to Maintain Presence in Spratlys, PHILIPPINE STAR, Mar. 29, 
2011, 
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=670842&publicationSubCategoryId=.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Philippines to Bolster Watch in Disputed Spratlys, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 28, 2011, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9M89S6G1.htm.  
 50. Id; Florantes S. Solmerin, Military to Install Radars on Nine Spratly Islands, 
MANILA STANDARD TODAY, Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/ 
insidenews.htm?f=2011/march/8/news1.isx&d=2011/march/8. 
2012] The Building of China’s Great Wall at Sea 261 
 
claimed EEZ, approximately 80 nm west of Palawan Island.51  The 
events off of Palawan were repeated in May 2011 off the coast of 
Vietnam when China Marine Surveillance vessels cut the exploration 
cable of the Binh Minh 02, a survey ship being operated by Petro 
Vietnam.52  The ship was approximately 116 nm off Dai Lanh, which is 
well within Vietnam’s claimed EEZ.53  Two weeks later, on June 9, 
2011, a Chinese fishing vessel that was operating with two China 
Maritime Surveillance patrol vessels intentionally rammed the survey 
cable of the Viking 2, which was conducting a seismic survey 
approximately 60 nm off the southern coast of Vietnam well within 
Vietnam’s EEZ and over 1,000 km from Hainan Island.54   However, 
Chinese aggression has not been limited to Vietnam.  Admiral Willard, 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before Congress in 
January of 2010 as to China’s increased aggressiveness, stating that 
“[t]he [People’s Liberation Army (PLA)] Navy has increased its patrols 
throughout the [South China Sea] region and has shown an increased 
willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the 
contested island chains.”55  In March of 2010, six PLA ships conducted a 
training exercise in the vicinity of Fiery Cross Reef.56  A month later, 
China began escorting its fishing vessels in the contested area after a 
Malaysian warship allegedly removed the cover of its gun mount and 
shadowed Chinese fishing vessels that were operating near Layang 
Island in the Spratly archipelago.57  Finally, China reasserted its 
“indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea by conducting an 
unprecedented military exercise involving ships and aircraft from all 
                                            
 51. Scott Weeden, Palawan Gas Development Sparks Chinese Protest, E&P, Nov. 14, 
2011, http://www.epmag.com/Production-Drilling/Palawan-Gas-Development-Sparks-
Chinese-Protest_91573#.  
 52. VN Demands China Stop Sovereignty Violations, VIETNAM PLUS, May 29, 2011, 
http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-demands-China-stop-sovereigntyviolations/20115/18615.v
nplus.  
 53.  Id. 
 54. See Sea Spat Raises China-Vietnam tensions, NAMVIET NEWS, June 10, 2011, 
http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/2011/06/10/sea-spat-raises-china-vietnam-tensions/.  
 55. U.S. Pacific Command: Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee 
on U.S. Pacific Command Posture (Mar. 23, 2010) (Statement of Admiral Robert F. 
Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander), available at http://www.pacom.mil/web/ 
pacom_resources/pdf/willard_statement _HASC_032510.pdf.  
 56. Brian Cross, The Spratly and Paracel Islands: Issues in the South China Sea, 
SUITE101.COM, June 7, 2010, http://news.suite101.com/article.cfm/the-spratly-and-
paracel-islands-issues-in-the-south-china-sea-a245756.  
 57. Koichi Furuya et al., China Ratcheting up Regional Tension, ASAHI SHIMBUN, 
July 24, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201007230527.html.  
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three of its fleets, in response to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
statement before a July 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum that “[t]he United States, like 
every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open 
access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in 
the South China Sea” and that “[t]he United States supports a 
collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the 
various territorial disputes without coercion.”58 
Further, Chinese ships and aircraft routinely harass and interfere with 
U.S. military ships and aircraft conducting lawful activities in and over 
China’s EEZ in the South China Sea.  Although there have been 
countless confrontations between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft at 
sea, the two most notable incidents receiving extensive media coverage 
were the EP-3 incident in 2001 and the Impeccable incident in 2009.   
On April 1, 2001, two Chinese F-8 fighter aircrafts intercepted a U.S. 
EP-3 that had been conducting a routine reconnaissance flight about 
seventy miles southeast of Hainan Island.59  While making a close 
approach to the EP-3, one of the F-8s lost control and collided with the 
EP-3, forcing the U.S. aircraft to make an emergency landing at the 
Lingshui military airfield on Hainan.60  The crew was detained by the 
PLA for eleven days before being released and the aircraft was not 
returned until July 2001.61  In March 2009, five Chinese vessels—three 
government ships and two small cargo ships—harassed the Impeccable 
(T-AGOS 23) while the vessel was engaged in lawful military activities 
in the South China Sea approximately 75 nm from Hainan Island.62  The 
cargo ships intentionally stopped in front of the Impeccable, forcing the 
U.S. ship to make an emergency all-stop to avoid a collision.63  It is clear 
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from the video tape of the incident that the cargo ships were acting as 
proxies for the Chinese government vessels.  What is more, in June 2009, 
a Chinese submarine collided with the USS John S. McCain’s (DDG 56) 
as it was towing sonar array off the Philippine coast approximately 144 
nautical miles from Subic Bay.64  It is unknown whether the collision 
was intentional or just another example of poor seamanship by the PLA. 
Many of the above actions took place after China agreed to abide by 
the 2002 Joint Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
which requires the various claimants to “undertake to resolve their 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without 
resorting to the threat or the use of force.”65  There is little evidence that 
China had any intention of abiding by the declaration, but rather, it seems 
China used the declaration to buy time to strengthen its existing outposts, 
as well as occupy further features in the South China Sea.66  
C. The Eastern Portion of the Wall—the East China Sea 
The foundation for the eastern bastions was laid in 1958 with the 
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government of China’s 
Territorial Sea, where article 1 identified Taiwan as Chinese territory.67  
The wall was significantly strengthened in 1972 with adoption of the 
“One-China” policy by the United States, confirmed in 1978 and 1982, 
which recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China.68  
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China re-affirmed its claim to Taiwan in article 2 of the 1992 Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone.69  And in 1998, China fortified the wall by enacting the Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China, 
which illegally provides in article 13 that “China may enact laws and 
regulations relating to transit passage of foreign vessels and aircraft” 
through the Taiwan Strait.70  This law violates the law of the sea, 
reflected in article 36 of UNCLOS, which guarantees freedom of 
navigation through straits that contain a high seas or EEZ corridor.71  
In 1995 and 1996, China took further steps to strengthen the eastern 
seawall around Taiwan by conducting a series of military exercises off 
the Taiwanese coast in an effort to dissuade the Kuomintang party’s 
independence movement, designed to influence the March 1996 
presidential election.72  From July 21 28, 1995, the PLA conducted a 
series of exercises off the coast of Taiwan, including the launching of six 
surface-to-surface missiles that landed within 100 miles of Taiwan.73  
There was no visible United States response to the exercises.  Although 
the USS Nimitz transited the Taiwan Strait in December 1995, the first 
transit of a U.S. carrier since 1979, in actuality the ship was diverted 
through the strait due to bad weather, not as a show of support for 
Taiwan.74  In March 1996, the PLA conducted a second and more 
aggressive round of exercises; surface-to-surface missiles were again 
fired off the coast of Taiwan, some of which impacted within twenty 
miles of the northern port of Keelung.75  U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry 
suggested deploying a carrier battle group to the Taiwan Strait as a 
deterrent.76  Unfortunately, he was overruled by the National Security 
Council and, instead, the Administration ordered two carrier battle 
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groups—the Independence and Nimitz—to the region to observe the PLA 
exercises.77  Although the U.S. carrier presence provided a temporary 
deterrent to China, the ships remained outside the strait, and as a result, 
the wall inched higher.78  
The extension of the wall to the northeast began in earnest in the 
1970s when the dispute between Japan and China over ownership of the 
Senkaku Islands took on a new dimension after a 1969 report by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
indicated the possibility of large oil and gas reserves in the vicinity of the 
islands.79  Despite having returned the islands to Japanese administrative 
control in 1971 under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty,80 U.S. ambivalence 
over the underlying sovereignty claims emboldened China to re-assert 
ownership over the Senkakus and claim an extended continental shelf to 
the limits of the Okinawa Trough.81  For example, when submitting the 
Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, the 
Department of State specifically indicated that reversion of the Senkakus 
to Japanese administrative control did not prejudice the underlying 
sovereignty claims to the islands.82  Subsequent Administrations have 
retained this neutral stance.83  In short, despite acknowledging that the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty84 applied to the Senkakus, the United States 
has done little to support its treaty ally on this important and sensitive 
issue.85 
Chinese incursions into the waters around the Senkakus significantly 
increased in number, as well as intensity, after Japan declared an EEZ 
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around the islands in 1996.86   For example, between 2003 and 2004, the 
number of incursions into Japanese waters by Chinese naval and other 
government vessels jumped from six to thirty-four.87  Chinese 
aggressiveness has likewise increased.88  For instance, in April of 2010, a 
PLA helicopter buzzed a Japanese surveillance vessel, which had been 
monitoring Chinese military exercises in waters off Okinawa, coming 
within ninety meters of the Japanese ship.89  Similarly, in May of 2010, a 
Japanese oceanographic survey vessel, Shoyo, was pursued by a Chinese 
inspection ship, Haijian 51, and ordered to leave “Chinese waters” about 
198 miles northwest of Amani Oshima Island.90   
Japan-China relations dipped to an all-time low following an incident 
in September 2010 between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese 
patrol vessels.91  Following several high-level demands and threats of 
strong countermeasures if the captain was not unconditionally released, 
Tokyo ultimately succumbed and released the captain, who had been 
held for two weeks.92  Citing diplomatic considerations, Japanese 
prosecutors suspended investigation of the charges—obstructing officials 
on duty—which it had initially brought against the captain.93  Although 
Japan’s decision to confront Chinese aggression was admirable, it failed 
to achieve its intended purpose when Tokyo gave in to Chinese 
demands.94  Unfortunately, despite assurances by Secretary of State 
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Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates that article 5 of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty applied to the Senkakus, there was little in the way of 
actual U.S. support for Japan during this incident.95 
D.  The Northern Portion of the Wall—Gulf of Bo Hai  
and the Yellow Sea 
The initial bricks for the northern wall were also laid in 1958.  article 
2 of the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China identified the waters of the Bohai Bay as Chinese inland waters.96  
In 2001, the wall was extended seaward when a PLA Jianheu III-class 
frigate aggressively confronted the Bowditch (T-AGS 62), which was 
legally conducting a routine military survey in the Yellow Sea. 97  The 
unarmed hydrographic survey ship was ordered to leave the Chinese EEZ 
or suffer the consequences.98  Being an unarmed auxiliary, the Bowditch 
complied with the order, but returned several days later with a naval 
escort to complete its mission.99   
Eight years later, Chinese vessels once again harassed a U.S. ship 
that was conducting routine surveillance operations in the Yellow Sea.100  
In May of 2009, two Chinese fishing vessels came within ninety feet of 
the Victorious (T-AGOS-19), prompting the unarmed ship to use its 
water hose to ward off the Chinese boats.101  As in the earlier case of the 
Impeccable, video tapes of the Victorious incident clearly demonstrate 
that the Chinese trawlers were acting as proxies for the PLA Navy.102 
The wall was extended further east and north in July 2010, after 
China voiced strong objections to the planned deployment of the George 
Washington (CVN 73) to the Yellow Sea, where it was to conduct a joint 
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military exercise with South Korean forces.103  After it was announced in 
July 2010 that the U.S. aircraft carrier would participate in “Invincible 
Spirit,” a joint U.S.-South Korea exercise intended to send a message to 
North Korea for its alleged sinking of the South Korean warship 
Cheonan earlier that year, China voiced strong objections to the presence 
of the carrier in the Yellow Sea, indicating that deploying the carrier to 
the Yellow Sea would be seen as provocative and a threat to Chinese 
national security, even though the U.S. carrier had conducted operations 
in the Yellow Sea earlier in the year without incident.104  Despite 
statements from the Pentagon that the United States reserved the right to 
operate in the Yellow Sea, the carrier was ultimately deployed east of the 
Korean peninsula in an apparent effort to appease China’s concerns.105  
Rather than acknowledge the U.S. gesture, Beijing responded to the 
decision to keep the carrier east of the Korean peninsula with a live-fire 
naval exercise of its own in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5.106   
The northern wall was further strengthened in August 2010 when the 
United Nations Command in Seoul announced that the George 
Washington would not participate in “Ulchi Freedom Guardian,” a 
second joint exercise with South Korea in mid-August, despite 
statements by the Pentagon in early August that the George Washington 
would take part in a sequence of exercises with South Korea, “including 
exercising in the Yellow Sea.”107  China responded to these U.S. press 
statements by announcing that the PLA Navy would conduct a live-fire 
exercise in the Yellow Sea.108   On August 31 of that year, the United 
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States announced, yet again, that the George Washington would not take 
part in an anti-submarine exercise in the Yellow Sea that had been 
planned to take place from September 5-9.109  Finally, in late November 
of 2010, the George Washington deployed to the Yellow Sea to conduct 
a joint exercise with the South Korean Navy.110  However, the 
deployment was pre-announced by the U.S. administration and was the 
subject of a Chinese diplomatic protest well in advance of the 
exercise.111  In short, as was the case with the lack of U.S. carrier 
presence in the Taiwan Strait during the 1990s, every day that passes 
without a routine unannounced U.S. carrier presence in the Yellow Sea 
adds another brick to the northern wall. 
E.  The Inner Defensive Wall—China’s Straight Baseline Claims 
Anticipating that the outer wall may someday be breached, China has 
also constructed an inner defensive wall along its entire coastline.  The 
initial foundation for the inner defenses was laid in 1958.112  Article 2 of 
the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
China’s Territorial Sea indicated that the territorial sea would be 
measured from baselines “composed of straight lines connecting bas 
[sic]-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost coastal islands,” 
and that all waters landward of the baselines, as well as all of the islands 
inside the baselines (including Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the 
Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and 
Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island, and the Tungting 
Islands), were considered internal waters.113  Article 3 of the 1992 Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone likewise indicated that the territorial sea would be 
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measured twelve nautical miles out from straight baselines along the 
coast, but did not define the base points.114  
China solidified its straight baseline claims in 1996 with the 
Statement of the Chinese Government on the Baseline of the Territorial 
Sea, which identified forty-nine base points along mainland China and 
twenty-eight base points around the Xisha Islands.115  However, most of 
the Chinese coast does not meet the geographic conditions articulated in 
the UNCLOS for applying straight baselines.116   
The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is 
the low-water line.117  Straight baselines may only be used where the 
coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity.118  China’s straight baseline 
claims are therefore illegal under international law.119  Although the 
United States has diplomatically protested China’s claim, it has been 
nearly fifteen years since the U.S. Navy has operationally challenged the 
illegal baselines under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program.120 
III.  MORE “WORDS” FROM THE UNITED STATES 
There is an old Chinese Proverb which states that “talk doesn’t cook 
rice.”121  Domestic laws, diplomatic protest, and sovereignty claims are 
meaningless unless backed with some level of implementation.  When 
words have been insufficient to adequately advance China’s interest, 
Beijing has not been reluctant to use force and coercion to advance its 
position (e.g., the 1974 invasion of the Paracels, the 1988 skirmish with 
Vietnam off Johnson South Reef, the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef, 
interference with Vietnamese and Filipino survey vessels and fishing 
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boats in their respective EEZs, etc.).122  Unfortunately, the United States 
has normally been slow to respond to Chinese imperialism at sea over the 
past forty years.  However, in 2010, several U.S. officials unexpectedly 
engaged in a new war of words with China over its illegal claims in the 
South China Sea.123  This begs the question: is the United States ready to 
match words with action? 
Following China’s announcement in March 2010 that the South 
China Sea was now a “core interest” for China, Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates responded by stating that the South China Sea was an “area of 
growing concern” for the United States.124  Addressing the annual 
meeting of defense ministers in Singapore (Shangri-La Dialogue) in June 
2010, Secretary Gates indicated, inter alia, that it was a longstanding 
policy of the United States to defend freedom of navigation and that the 
United States would continue to do so.125  He further emphasized that the 
South China Sea was “not only vital to those directly bordering it, but to 
all nations with economic and security interests in Asia” and that U.S. 
policy was clear:   
[I]t is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and 
unhindered economic development be maintained.  We do not 
take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do 
oppose the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of 
navigation.  We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. 
corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate 
economic activity.  All parties must work together to resolve 
differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with 
customary international law.  The 2002 Declaration of Conduct 
was an important step in this direction, and we hope that 
concrete implementation of this agreement will continue.126 
A month later at the annual meeting of the ARF in Vietnam, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also took the opportunity to re-
emphasize the importance of the South China Sea to the United States, 
indicating that the “United States, like every nation, has a national 
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime 
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commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”127  
She further elaborated that the United States supported a “collaborative 
diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial 
disputes without coercion,” and that the United States opposed “the use 
or threat of force by any claimant.”128  She re-emphasized U.S. neutrality 
on the sovereignty issue, indicating that “the United States does not take 
sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South 
China Sea.”129  However, she stressed that the “claimants should pursue 
their territorial claims and the company and rights to maritime space in 
accordance with [UNCLOS]” and that, “[c]onsistent with customary 
international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China 
Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.” 130 
She finally expressed support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and encouraged “the 
parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct,” offering U.S. 
assistance “to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures 
consistent with the declaration.”131 She concluded by stating that “it is in 
the interest of all claimants and the broader international community for 
unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions” and 
suggesting the importance of “[r]espect for the interests of the 
international community and responsible efforts to address these 
unresolved claims [to] help create the conditions for resolution of the 
disputes and a lowering of regional tensions.”132  
These statements, although welcomed, are really not that different 
from the position the United States has been articulating for the South 
China Sea since the mid-1990s.  In a statement issued by the State 
Department in May 1995, the United States made similar statements: 
The United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions 
and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in 
that region. The United States strongly opposes the use or threat 
of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to 
exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions.  
 
The United States has an abiding interest in the maintenance of 
peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States 
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calls upon claimants to intensify diplomatic efforts which 
address issues related to the competing claims, taking into 
account the interests of all parties, and which contribute to peace 
and prosperity in the region. The United States is willing to assist 
in any way that the claimants deem helpful. The United States 
reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the 
South China Sea.  
 
Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of 
the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft 
in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity 
of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States.  
 
The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the 
competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs, 
atolls, and cays in the South China Sea. The United States 
would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim 
or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that 
was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.133  
Similarly, on June 16, 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security, Joseph Nye, stated in Tokyo that "[i]f military 
action occurred in the Spratlys and this interfered with the freedom of the 
seas, then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that navigation 
continues."134  In addition, a Pentagon study conducted in the same year 
re-affirmed U.S. neutrality on the sovereignty issue, but also indicated 
that the United States had a “strategic interest in maintaining the lines of 
communication linking South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the Indian 
Ocean” and that the United States would “resist any maritime claims 
beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention."135  The only 
real difference between the 1995 and 2010 positions is the reference to 
the 2002 declaration, but, of course, the 2002 declaration was not in 
existence in 1995.  Additionally, the specific reference to multilateral 
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discussions and the offer to act as a mediator to the dispute is also a new 
development and is a strong position going forward.     
IV.  IS THE WALL IMPREGNABLE? 
Like all of China’s previous walls, the seawall can be breeched.  
However, it will take a concerted effort on the part of the United States 
and its international partners to do so.  Those who believe appeasement 
is the answer and that China will react as a responsible state actor are 
seriously misplaced.  Having sat across the table from Chinese 
counterparts during numerous negotiations, including at the International 
Maritime Organization, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, 
and the United Nations Office at Vienna, my experiences suggest that 
China does not respect appeasement.  On the contrary, Beijing sees 
weakness as an opening to be exploited.  In short, China only respects 
power, not concessions.   
Not only is appeasement counterproductive, it undercuts the naval 
power and capabilities of the United States.  As Senator Webb correctly 
observed in 2009, “only [the] United States has both the stature and the 
national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China 
brings to [the South China Sea dispute.]”136  Senator Webb also correctly 
stated that, based on previous U.S. reactions to events in the South China 
Sea, “it appears the United States is responding to maritime incidents as 
singular tactical challenges, while China appears to be acting with a 
strategic vision.”137  In short, the United States has been disengaged in 
the South China Sea since the 1960s, choosing instead to remain neutral 
with regard to the various conflicting sovereignty claims, while at the 
same time stressing the importance of freedom of navigation throughout 
this strategic waterway.  Until recently, the U.S. response to China’s 
aggression in the South China Sea has been feeble at best, resulting in 
steady reinforcement of the southern portion of China’s seawall for a 
period lasting over sixty years. 
After Secretary Clinton’s recent statements at the ARF,138 the United 
States has an opportunity to end its long-storied ambivalence and take a 
more active approach to countering Chinese dominance in the South 
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China Sea.  Impending U.S. defense cuts, however, have raised concerns 
that, like the official position of the United States in 1995, nothing will 
come of Secretary Clinton’s statements to the ARF.139  If the United 
States is going to maintain its credibility in the region, it needs to dispel 
the international community of that notion by matching its words with 
action.  Fortunately, the Obama Administration is off to a good start.   
In June 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with 
Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert del Rosario, in 
Washington to discuss Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.140  At 
a joint press conference following the meeting, Secretary Clinton stated 
[t]he Philippines and the United States are longstanding allies, 
and we are committed to honoring our mutual obligations. . . . 
We are concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea 
could undermine peace and stability in the region. We urge all 
sides to exercise self-restraint, and we will continue to consult 
closely with all countries involved, including our treaty ally, the 
Philippines. [T]he United States has a national interest in 
freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and 
unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea. We share 
these interests not only with ASEAN members but with other 
maritime nations in the broader international community. The 
United States does not take sides on territorial disputes over land 
features in the South China Sea, but we oppose the use of force 
or the threat of force to advance the claims of any party. We 
support resolving disputes through a collaborative diplomatic 
presence and process without coercion. We believe governments 
should pursue their territorial claims and the accompanying 
rights to maritime space in accordance with customary 
international law, as reflected also in the Law of the Sea 
Convention. The United States supports the 2002 ASEAN China 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
and we encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code 
of conduct. We look forward to having discussions on these 
issues at the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum in July.141 
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In response to a question regarding China’s position that the United 
States did not have a role to play in helping resolve the South China Sea 
dispute, Secretary Clinton responded that the U.S. position remained the 
same:  
We support a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants 
to resolve their disputes without the use or threat of force. We’re 
troubled by the recent incidents in the South China Sea. . . . 
These reported incidents clearly present significant maritime 
security issues, including the freedom of navigation, respect for 
international law, and the lawful, unimpeded economic 
development and commerce that all nations are entitled to 
pursue. We support the ASEAN China declaration on the 
conduct of parties in the South China Sea. And . . .  we 
encourage the parties to reach a full code of conduct. . . . [T]he 
United States [does not] take a position on competing 
sovereignty claims over land features. . . .  But the United States 
is prepared to support the initiatives led by ASEAN and work 
with the South China Sea’s claimants to meet their concerns.142 
More importantly, in response to a question regarding U.S. intentions 
under the mutual defense treaty (MDT), Secretary Clinton responded that 
the United States would honor its commitments under the defense 
treaty.143  She added that the United States would endeavor “to support 
the Philippines in their desires for external support for maritime defense 
and the other issues” and was “determined and committed to supporting 
the defense of the Philippines,” which includes  “trying to find ways of 
providing affordable material and equipment that will assist the 
Philippine military to take the steps necessary to defend itself.”144 
Later that week, Secretary del Rosario met with U.S. Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon.145  At that meeting Secretary 
Gates echoed Secretary Clinton’s assurances, indicating that the United 
States was prepared to help the Philippines strengthen their capabilities 
to secure their maritime territory.146  And on June 24, 2011, Secretary del 
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Rosario met with U.S. National Director for Intelligence James Clapper, 
who pledged to enhance intelligence-sharing with Manila to improve the 
Philippines’ maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea.147  A 
week later, Philippine and U.S. naval forces, including the Chung-Hoon 
(DDG 93), Howard (DDG 83), and Safeguard (T-ARS 50), began the 
17th Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise in 
Puerto Princesa, Palawan.148  This is only the second time that CARAT 
has been held on Palawan.149  The eleven-day exercise focused on “Visit, 
Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) exercises; diver training; salvage 
operations; joint medical, dental and civic action projects; and aircrew 
familiarization exchanges,” as well as “operations planning, search and 
rescue practices, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, 
interagency cooperation and public affairs . . . , maritime interdiction 
operations, information sharing, combined operations at sea, patrol 
operations and gunnery exercises, plus anti-piracy exercises and anti-
smuggling exercises.”150  Two months later, on August 17, the United 
States made good on its earlier promise to enhance Manila’s military 
capabilities by delivering a Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the 
Philippine Navy.151  A second cutter will be provided in the first or 
second quarter of 2012.152  The United States also continues to support 
and finance the completion of the Coast Watch South (CWS) project.153  
Once finished, the network of seventeen radar and communication 
stations will provide the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)  the 
ability to better monitor activities in the South China Sea and the Sulu 
Sea.154 
The Administration has likewise stepped up bilateral military 
interaction with Vietnam.   In July 2011, for example, Vietnamese naval 
units participated in a bilateral exercise off Danang with units from the 
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U.S. Seventh Fleet—Chung-Hoon (DDG-93), Preble (DDG-56), and a 
rescue and salvage ship.155  The exercise, which was designed to 
strengthen military ties between the two former enemies, included a 
number of non-combat activities, including a search and rescue exercise, 
navigation training, and several community-service projects.156  A 
similar exercise, involving the John S. Mccain (DDG-56), was conducted 
in 2010,157 a few months before Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan 
Dung announced at the closing of the 17th ASEAN summit that his 
country was reopening Cam Ranh Bay to foreign navies.158 
Following these bilateral exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam, 
the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullens – 
visited China at the invitation of the PLA.  At a speech at Renmin 
University on July 10, 2011, the Admiral stated that “now more than ever 
the United States is a Pacific nation and it is clear that our security 
interests and our economic well-being are tied to Asia’s [well-being].”159  
He additionally emphasized that the United States was “deepening its 
commitment to this region and the alliances and partnerships that define 
our presence here [and] . . . .  we will remain a Pacific power, just as 
China is a Pacific power.”160  More specifically, in response to a 
question regarding U.S. military exercises in the region, Admiral Mullen 
indicated that the United States has “had a presence in this region for 
decades, and . . . certainly the intent is to broaden and deepen our 
interests here and our relationships here.”161  Finally, the Admiral 
repeated the U.S. policy that the “United States doesn’t take a position on 
resolution of the disputes between two countries, but is very focused on 
working towards solutions which are peaceful and don’t result in 
conflict.”162 
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The next day, in response to a statement by General Chen Bingde, 
Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, at a joint press conference in 
Beijing that U.S. naval exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines were 
“extremely inappropriate,” Admiral Mullen reiterated that the United 
States would maintain its presence in the Asia Pacific and emphasized 
that U.S. reconnaissance flights and other military operations and 
exercises “are all conducted in accordance with international norms, and 
essentially we will continue to comply with that in the future.”163  Rear 
Admiral Tom Carney, Commander Logistics Group Western 
Pacific/Commander Task Force 73, speaking in Danang, Vietnam later 
that day, echoed Admiral Mullen’s statement, indicating that the United 
States has “had a presence in the Western Pacific and the South China 
Sea for 50 to 60 years, even going back before World War II [and] . . . . 
[w]e have no intention of departing from that kind of activity.”164  
Finally, on his return trip to Washington, Admiral Mullen told reporters 
at a press conference in Tokyo on July 15, 2011, that “the United States 
is a Pacific power [and] . . . . we are not going away.”165  More 
specifically, in response to a question regarding Chinese aggression in 
the South China Sea, the Chairman re-stated that the United States does 
not take a position with respect to resolving the disputes.166  However, he 
stressed that the United States takes  a “very strong position with respect 
to the international standard of freedom of navigation.  And it isn’t 
whether or not the United States is involved in a freedom of navigation 
issue, because a violation of a freedom of navigation issue by anybody is 
of concern to many, many countries internationally.”167  Admiral Mullen 
concluded the press conference by stating that peace and stability in the 
Asia Pacific region “is critical to those who live here, but also to the 
United States.”168 
Several months later, in November 2011, the United States and the 
Philippines marked the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines MDT 
with the signing of the Manila Declaration on board the Fitzgerald (DDG 
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62) in Manila Bay on November 16, 2011.169   In the declaration, the 
Philippines and the United States reaffirm “the continuing relevance of 
the treaty for peace, security, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region . . 
. .  [and] reaffirm the treaty as the foundation of our relationship for the 
next 60 years and beyond.”170 In this regard both sides “expect to 
maintain a robust, balanced, and responsive security partnership 
including cooperating to enhance the defense, interdiction, and 
apprehension capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”171  
Both sides also indicated that they “share a common interest in 
maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and 
transit of people across the seas and subscribe to a rules-based approach 
in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through peaceful, 
collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes within the 
framework of international law.”172 
Three days later, at the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia, 
Asia-Pacific leaders stressed the importance of regional cooperation to 
address the region’s political and security challenges, including maritime 
security.173   President Obama’s participation in the event underscored 
the U.S. commitment, previously articulated by Secretary Clinton and 
other administration officials, to remain actively engaged in the region. 
With regard to maritime security issues, the President emphasized that   
[t]he Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the world’s busiest 
ports and most critical lines of commerce and communication.  
Recent decades of broad regional economic success have been 
underpinned by a shared commitment to freedom of navigation 
and international law.  At the same time, the region faces a host 
of maritime challenges, including territorial and maritime 
disputes, ongoing naval military modernization, trafficking of 
illicit materials, piracy, and natural disasters.174 
The President also articulated a “principles-based U.S. approach to 
maritime security, including freedom of navigation and overflight and 
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other internationally lawful uses of the seas, as well as use of 
collaborative diplomatic processes to address disputes.”175  He 
additionally “expressed strong opposition to the threat or use of force by 
any party to advance its territorial or maritime claims or interfere in 
legitimate economic activity” and reiterated U.S. support for the 2002 
ASEAN Declaration of Conduct and encouraged all parties to conclude a 
full code at the earliest opportunity.176  The President further stated that 
the United States is working with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region 
to build capacity and promote cooperation on maritime security issues 
by: 
• Providing training, assistance, and equipment to regional 
maritime police and civil authorities to enhance their 
capabilities to secure the maritime space and address 
transnational security challenges such as piracy, illicit 
trafficking, and illegal fishing; 
• Building facilities and providing equipment and technical 
support to enhance the ability of Southeast Asian nations to 
monitor the maritime domain and assess and share 
information; 
• Hosting regional workshops to promote adherence to 
standard operating procedures and protocols that ensure 
safety at sea, help build a shared vision of international 
norms and behaviors in the maritime domain, and foster 
discussion of interpretations of customary international law; 
and 
• Hosting and co-hosting multinational capacity-building 
exercises with regional military partners.177 
Then on November 16, 2011, President Obama announced that the 
United States intended to increase its military presence in Australia 
beginning in mid-2012.178  Speaking at a joint press conference in 
Canberra on November 16, 2011, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
stated that the two long-time allies had agreed  
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to expand the existing collaboration between the Australian 
Defence Force and the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force 
. . . [Beginning in] mid-2012, Australia will welcome 
deployments of a company-size rotation of 200 to 250 Marines 
in the Northern Territory for around six months at a time.179 
The total force is expected to grow to around 2,500 personnel over the 
next few years.  In addition, a second component of the initiate grants  
greater access by U.S. military aircraft to the Royal Australian 
Air Force facilities in our country’s north.  This will involve 
more frequent movements of U.S. military aircraft into and out 
of northern Australia.  Now, taken together, these two initiatives 
make our alliance stronger, they strengthen our cooperation in 
our region.180  
Prime Minister Gillard added that the U.S.-Australia alliance 
has been a bedrock of stability in our region.  So building on our 
alliance through this new initiative is about stability. . . . It will 
be good for our Australian Defence Force to increase their  
capabilities by joint training, combined training, with the U.S. 
Marines and personnel.  It will mean that we are postured to 
better respond together, along with other partners in the Asia 
Pacific, to any regional contingency, including the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and dealing with natural disasters.181 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a number of measures the United States should take to 
continue to reassure friends and allies that it is committed to maintaining 
a long-term presence in the Pacific as a counter-weight to growing 
Chinese military power and aggressive behavior. 
First, the United States should follow Indonesia’s lead and 
diplomatically protest China’s U-shaped line claim in the South China 
Sea.182   This can be done without taking sides on the underlying 
territorial disputes between China and the other Spratly claimants.  The 
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United States should also encourage its regional partners (e.g., Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand,  and Singapore) and other 
maritime states (e.g., United Kingdom, Germany, France, Norway, 
Netherlands, Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Marshall Islands, and the 
Bahamas) to do the same.  Indonesia does not have a dog in the fight 
over the Spratly Islands, yet it has already filed an official protest to 
China’s nine-dotted line claim in the South China Sea, indicating that 
claim has no basis in international law.183  
Secondly, the United States must maintain a robust and visible naval 
presence in the region through frequent deployments and routine FON 
operations,184 particularly in the vicinity of the islets occupied by China.  
A good starting place for such operations would be in the Paracel Islands 
and in the vicinity of Mischief Reef, both of which are occupied by 
Chinese military forces.  There is evidence of possible Congressional 
support for such an initiative. For example, on June 27, 2011 Senate 
Resolution 217 passed by unanimous consent, providing in part that the 
Senate “supports the continuation of operations by the United States 
Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international 
waters and air space in the South China Sea.”185  Increased bilateral 
exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea 
discussed above, as well as the rotational deployments of U.S. Marines to 
Australia, are also a step in the right direction.  The Administration must 
also not give in to Chinese pressure to stop or reduce U.S. surveillance 
operations in and over the EEZ.  As Admiral Mullen reiterated in his last 
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trip to the Pacific, the United States has “operated in the South China Sea 
for many decades . . . [and] will continue to do that, and I’m sure other 
countries will as well.” 186  Accordingly, the United States should 
continue to conduct lawful military operations and exercises in the 
region, including surveillance and reconnaissance flights.187     
Third, the United States should also use economic sanctions to warn 
China that it will not tolerate further threats.  Threats against the United 
States and other international entities or corporations that seek to do 
business with other South China Sea claimants, particularly Vietnam, 
should be answered with targeted economic sanctions and reciprocal 
treatment of Chinese business interests in the United States. Vietnam is 
of heightened concern because of the particularly egregious Chinese 
interference with Vietnamese survey activities within Vietnam’s EEZ, 
referenced above.188  Chinese marine surveillance ships have interfered 
with Vietnamese survey ships despite the fact that the targeted 
Vietnamese vessels were operating within Vietnam’s  200 nm EEZ and 
there was no Chinese land feature or disputed territory within 200 nms of 
where the incident occurred.189  Vietnam has the exclusive right under 
international law to explore, exploit, and manage the living and non-
living resources located within its EEZ and continental shelf and such a 
blatant disregard of Vietnam’s rights in its own EEZ by China are 
especially disconcerting.190   
Fourth, the United States must officially protest and make public 
each and every incident where Chinese ships and aircraft aggressively 
interfere with U.S. military ships and aircraft in violation of international 
law, including the UNCLOS and the Collision Regulations.191  Similar 
protests should be filed when cargo ships and fishing vessels are used as 
government proxies to interfere with U.S. ships.  Sporadic, non-public 
demarches by the United States give the wrong impression to the 
international community and the American public that unlawful and 
unsafe Chinese interference with U.S. ships and aircraft, like the 
Bowditch, EP-3, Impeccable, and Victorious, are isolated incidents.  In 
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reality, unlawful Chinese interference with U.S. military activities in the 
EEZ has become a matter of routine.   
Fifth, the United States must re-examine its position from 1995 with 
regard to the Philippine claims in the South China Sea,192 and continue to 
reiterate its defense commitments under the U.S.-Philippine Mutual 
Defense Treaty,193 particularly with respect to Scarborough Shoal and 
the Kalayaan Island Group.  By not taking a position on the Philippine 
claims, the United States is, in effect, taking a position in support of 
China’s illegal claims.  Because the Philippines have a superior claim to 
these islands, under articles IV and V of the Treaty, the United States 
must acknowledge its obligation to protect the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, its public vessels, and its aircraft “in the Pacific.”194  U.S. 
support would counter Chinese “checkbook diplomacy” and prevent the 
AFP from falling under China’s sphere of influence.  Bilateral exercises 
between the AFP and U.S. Armed Forces should focus on developing 
contingency plans to confront Chinese aggression in the South China 
Sea.  Exercises conducted off Palawan in 2011 and 2012 appear to be 
headed in the right direction. 
Finally, the United States should encourage the other claimants to 
resolve their sovereignty disputes so that they can present a unified front 
against China in any future negotiations.  One possible option would be 
to recognize respective sovereignty claims over islands that are currently 
occupied by the various claimants.  Unless the other claimants can 
resolve their differences, they will be unable to present a unified position 
towards China, allowing the Chinese government to continue to apply its 
“divide and conquer” strategy while insisting on bilateral negotiations.  
U.S. actions must not, however, be limited to the South China Sea.  
The United States must apply equal pressure along the entire seawall to 
prevent further fortification by China.   
To the north, the United States must reiterate its commitment to a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue in accordance with the Taiwan 
Relations Act,195 which provides that “any effort to determine the future 
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means . . . [would be] of grave concern 
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to the United States.”196 Furthermore, U.S. warships, including carriers 
and big deck amphibious ships, must conduct routine and frequent 
transits through the Taiwan Strait.  The days of worrying about how 
China will react to the transit of a U.S. aircraft carrier through an 
international strait with a large high seas/EEZ corridor must cease 
immediately.   
With regard to the Senkakus, the time has come for the United States 
to back its treaty partner and recognize Japanese sovereignty over the 
islands.  This issue has taken on a new meaning following the September 
2010 incident between the Chinese fishing boat and the Japanese coast 
guard.197   The islands were placed under U.S. trusteeship pursuant to 
article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty198 and were administered by 
the United States from 1953 to 1971, without Chinese objection.199  In 
1971, the United States returned administrative control over the 
Senkakus to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.200  If the 
Senkakus had been considered Chinese territory at the end of the Second 
World War, the islands would not have been placed under U.S. 
administration in 1953.  The United States has made it clear to Japan that 
the Senkaku Islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security 
Treaty.201  However, the United States must also make clear to China 
that continued incursions in the vicinity of the Senkakus are unacceptable 
and that U.S. defense commitments under article V of the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty, which provides that “[e]ach [p]arty recognizes that an 
armed attack against either [p]arty in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and . . .  that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with 
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its constitutional provisions and processes,” apply to the Senkakus.202  
Additionally, routine military exercises should continue to be conducted 
with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and 
contingency plans developed to counter Chinese aggression in the East 
China Sea.  Bilateral and multilateral exercises with the JMSDF in the 
East China Sea in December 2010 (Keen Sword),203  January 2011 
(Yama Sakura),204 April 2011 (Malabar),205 and October/November 
2011 (Annual)206  are a step in the right direction. 
Moving to the high north, the Chinese reaction to the proposed joint 
military exercises off the Korean Peninsula is consistent with the Chinese 
government’s untenable position that foreign military activities in the 
EEZ are subject to coastal notice and consent.  While China’s position on 
the EEZ is clearly inconsistent with international law, including 
UNCLOS, the fact that the United States failed to send the George 
Washington into the Yellow Sea after Chinese objections to the joint 
exercises bolsters China’s position on the EEZ internationally and 
undermines U.S. FON interests, not only in the Pacific, but 
worldwide.207  The Administration’s decision to keep the carrier to the 
east of the Korean Peninsula for the first exercise was viewed as a sign of 
weakness, which will embolden Chinese officials to raise similar 
objections to future U.S. operations in the Pacific, and will be exploited 
by the Chinese Government, both domestically and internationally, as 
part of its lawfare strategy.  The Administration’s failure to include the 
George Washington in the second and third round of exercises, and 
providing prior notification for the November exercise, only exacerbates 
the problem.  As a matter of priority, the United States must continue to 
conduct frequent and unannounced exercises and operations in the 
Yellow Sea, including carrier operations. 
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Finally, although the United States has diplomatically protested 
many of China’s excessive maritime claims, it has not operationally 
challenged these claims under the FON Program for more than ten years.  
For instance, the United States has not challenged China’s excessive 
baselines or prior permission requirement for innocent passage since 
1997.208  The only exception to this paucity of FON challenges is U.S. 
intelligence and marine data collection activities in and above China’s 
EEZ by U.S. Special Mission Ships (SMS) and sensitive reconnaissance 
operations (SRO) aircraft.209  While the United States must continue a 
robust and visible SMS and SRO program in the South China, East 
China, and Yellow Seas, U.S. ships and aircraft must also challenge 
China’s excessive territorial sea and straight baseline claims at the 
earliest opportunity. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A renowned Singaporean diplomat and scholar—Ambassador 
Tommy Koh—recently wrote that although “China may be up and the 
US down at the moment … in the near term the US will ‘bounce back 
from this adversity as it had from all its previous adversities’ . . . and it 
will rebound not as a hegemon but as the ‘undisputable leader of the 
world.’”210  I agree with the Ambassador, but the United States can only 
reassert its role in the Pacific and counter China’s growing influence in 
the region by increasing its naval presence and demonstrating support for 
its regional partners with actions, not words.  Continuing to appease 
China will ultimately embolden Beijing to further solidify its seawall and 
fully implement its anti-access strategy and illegal maritime claims in the 
South China, East China, and Yellow Seas.  As President Obama 
remarked in November 2011, the United States welcomes   
a rising, peaceful China. . . . [However,] with their rise comes 
increased responsibilities.  It’s important for them to play by the 
rules of the road. . . . So where China is playing by those rules 
. . .  I think this is a win-win situation.  There are going to be 
times where they’re not, and we will send a clear message to 
them that we think that they need to be on track in terms of 
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